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951 
CACOPHONY OR CONCERTO?:  ANALYZING 
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE WIRETAP ACT’S 




The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“Wiretap Act”) prohibits 
the intentional interception of an electronic communication.  However, 
“parties to a communication” can intercept a communication without 
Wiretap Act liability.  Parties include the intended recipients of a 
communication.  When internet users navigate the internet, they 
communicate with websites using GET requests.  The users’ GET requests 
call out to websites and websites respond by providing the websites’ content 
to the users.  During this process, websites receive user data.  This data can 
include information about the website visited, the search terms used to locate 
the website, and referral data identifying the last web page the users visited. 
Digital advertisers may populate websites users visit with advertisements 
or plug-ins that allow users to “like” content.  In doing so, advertisers 
generate secondary GET requests between users and advertisers.  Secondary 
GET requests are duplicates of the GET requests between users and websites 
insofar as they share user data.  Advertisers retain and identify this data. 
In the Third and Ninth Circuits, internet users argued that digital 
advertisers used the duplicate GET requests to intercept user data contained 
in the GET requests between users and websites—arguably a violation of 
federal law under the Wiretap Act.  Digital advertisers invoked the party 
exception, arguing that advertisers were parties to the duplicate GET request 
between internet users and advertisers.  If so, the advertisers would be 
parties to the user data received in the duplicate GET requests and exempt 
from Wiretap Act liability.  The Third Circuit held that the party exception 
applied to the advertisers’ duplicate GET requests.  The Ninth Circuit 
rejected this approach and held that the party exception did not apply. 
This Note argues that digital advertisers are unintended recipients that are 
ineligible for the party exception.  First, transmitting duplicate user data via 
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a second communication is an effective—and sometimes necessary—method 
of interception for electronic communications on the internet.  In that case, 
duplicate GET requests may indicate interception.  This requires courts to 
analyze shared data, not individual GET requests.  Second, equating a direct 
recipient of a duplicate GET request with an intended recipient lacks judicial 
support and cannot properly decide party status.  Third, users enter URLs or 
click hyperlinks to navigate the internet.  This identifies the websites that 
users visit as the intended recipients of user data, not digital advertisers.  As 
such, advertisers are best categorized as unintended recipients and therefore 
ineligible for the Wiretap Act’s party exception. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1994, one of the first digital advertisements appeared on the internet.1  
Since then, digital advertisers have tailored digital advertising to internet 
users’ individual identities.2  This process requires vast amounts of user data; 
data brokers collect thousands of data points on millions of consumers.3  That 
user data can be used to tailor digital advertising “based on everything from 
users’ sexual orientations to their moods.”4  The user data necessary for 
tailored digital advertising has been allegedly collected from emails,5 the 
mobile applications that children use,6 and household appliances like smart 
televisions.7 
 
 1. What Is GDPR, the EU’s New Data Protection Law?, GDPR.EU, 
https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr [https://perma.cc/6DJ9-GMZC] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
 2. Stuart A. Thompson, Opinion, These Ads Think They Know You, N.Y. TIMES  
(Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/30/opinion/privacy-targeted-
advertising.html [https://perma.cc/DW6T-YHU3]. 
 3. See Natasha Singer, Mapping, and Sharing, the Consumer Genome, N.Y. TIMES  
(June 16, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/technology/acxiom-the-quiet-giant-
of-consumer-database-marketing.html [https://perma.cc/67SF-PKTN] (“Acxiom maintains 
its own database on about 190 million individuals and 126 million households in the United 
States.”). 
 4. Gilad Edelman, Why Don’t We Just Ban Targeted Advertising?, WIRED (Mar. 22, 
2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/why-dont-we-just-ban-targeted-advertising 
[https://perma.cc/M6PY-5FQY]. 
 5. Claire Cain Miller, Google Accused of Wiretapping in Gmail Scans, N.Y. TIMES  
(Oct. 1, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/02/technology/google-accused-of-
wiretapping-in-gmail-scans.html [https://perma.cc/T9HG-L94K]. 
 6. McDonald v. Kiloo APS, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1022, 1029–30 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (describing 
allegations that the defendants tracked and collected children’s personal data from mobile 
devices). 
 7. In re Vizio, Inc., Consumer Priv. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1212 (C.D. Cal. 2017) 
(“Plaintiffs allege that, unbeknownst to them, Vizio’s Smart TVs . . . collect and report 
consumers’ content viewing histories.”). 
954 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
The process of collecting user data can begin with something as simple as 
an internet user browsing the internet.8  In its essential form, the internet is 
built on a series of technical conversations.9  A typical internet user accesses 
internet shopping, social media, news, and a myriad of digital content by 
visiting websites served to a user via GET requests.10 
The GET request is a digital call and response; an internet user’s web 
browser calls out to the user’s intended destination—a particular website.11  
The website responds to the user’s GET request by displaying the website’s 
content.12  The user and website communicate digitally and, in the process, 
exchange data.13 
For example, a user visits The New York Times online.14  The user enters 
The New York Times’s URL into a web browser.15  This generates a GET 
request that is sent to The New York Times.16  The New York Times responds 
by providing access to the website.17 
At the same time, additional conversations can be created because of the 
code that Facebook, Google, and other digital advertisers embed in the 
websites that users visit.18  The code creates a secondary GET request 
directing a user’s web browser to contact the digital advertisers.19  Notably, 
this secondary GET request (“duplicate GET request”) is a duplicate of the 
first GET request insofar as the secondary request shares user data with the 
 
 8. Daniel B. Garrie & Rebecca Wong, Demystifying Clickstream Data:  A European and 
U.S. Perspective, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 563, 565–66 (2006) (describing user data collected 
by visiting websites). 
 9. Notwithstanding this Note’s simplification, accessing a website is more complicated.  
The process may generate forty-eight technical inquiries. Dan Luu, What Happens When You 
Load a URL?, https://www.danluu.com/navigate-url [https://perma.cc/G64R-9BJ6]  
(last visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
 10. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Priv. Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 268 (3d Cir. 2016) (“When a 
person uses a web browser to access a website, the browser sends a ‘GET’ request to the 
server.”). 
 11. See generally Client-Server Overview, MDN WEB DOCS, 
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Learn/Server-side/First_steps/Client-
Server_overview [https://perma.cc/8WVR-J7Z9] (last visited Sept.17, 2021) (“You can make 
a simple GET request by clicking on a link . . . .  [The response] contains the actual [website] 
HTML returned by the request.”). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Vasil v. Kiip, Inc., No. 16-CV-09937, 2018 WL 1156328, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 
2018) (finding identifiable data in URLs); see also infra notes 26–29 and accompanying text 
(outlining the identifiable data in GET requests, including the aforementioned URLs). 
 14. Chance v. Ave. A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1156 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (explaining 
step-by-step how a user would access nytimes.com via a GET request sent between a user and 
the website). 
 15. See id. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See id. 
 18. In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 596 (9th Cir. 2020) 
(explaining that Facebook embeds a “like” button containing Facebook code on affiliated 
websites). 
 19. Chance, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1156 (explaining that the initial communication between 
a user and a website can generate an additional communication used to contact a digital 
advertiser). 
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first request.20  This duplicate GET request not only delivers digital 
advertisements but also transmits the duplicate user data to the advertisers.21 
In the example, The New York Times responds to a user’s original GET 
request with access to its homepage, and an advertiser’s embedded code also 
directs a user’s web browser to contact advertisers using a duplicate GET 
request.22  The digital advertisers fill advertising space on The New York 
Times’s website.23  This duplicate GET request calls out to advertisers and 
the advertisers respond by serving digital advertisements.24 
For an advertiser, user data is important because it can be monetized.25  
The duplicate GET request transmits the URL a user entered.26  This 
identifies users’ web browsing histories.27  A duplicate GET request can also 
include user data identifying the search terms a user queried in order to locate 
the website28 or referral information identifying the last webpage a user 
visited.29  Because duplicate GET requests contain the same user data as the 
GET request between users and websites, advertisers can see user data they 
 
 20. See In re Facebook, 956 F.3d at 607 (“Facebook’s code directs the user’s browser to 
copy the referer [sic] header from the GET request and then send a separate but identical GET 
request and its associated referer [sic] header to Facebook’s server.”); see also Brown v. 
Google L.L.C., No. 20-CV-03664, 2021 WL 949372, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2021) 
(referring to these secondary GET requests as “duplicate GET requests” and noting that In re 
Facebook and In re Google also included duplicate GET requests). 
 21. Id. at 596. 
 22. See Russell A. Miller, The Legal Fate of Internet Ad-Blocking, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. 
L. 299, 313 (2018) (“The user’s browser responds to these secondary get-requests by calling 
for . . . subsidiary content, such as advertising.”); Chance, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1156. 
 23. Chance, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1156. 
 24. Id. (“This communication instructs Avenue A’s server to send the computer a banner 
advertisement to fill the blank space on the nytimes.com home page.”). 
 25. See In re Nickelodeon Consumer Priv. Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 266 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting 
that data powers “trackers, cookies, and algorithms designed to capture and monetize the 
information”). 
 26. See Orin Kerr, Websurfing and the Wiretap Act, WASH. POST (June 4, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/04/websurfing-and-
the-wiretap-act [https://perma.cc/U9J4-NBT6] (providing legal commentary on pending GET 
request litigation and considering the Wiretap Act implications—if any—of a technical 
process that concededly leads to the “disclosure of URLs to . . . third party sites.”). 
 27. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 n.6 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that 
URLs reveals users’ internet activity). 
 28. Vasil v. Kiip, Inc., No. 16-CV-09937, 2018 WL 1156328, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 
2018) (“[I]f a user searches for ‘The Few, The Proud’ on Google, the resulting URL contains 
‘the+few+the+proud’ . . . .”); Client-Server Overview, supra note 11 (providing an illustrative 
GET request that includes queried search terms “client+server+overview” within the GET 
request). 
 29. Burak Guzel, HTTP Headers for Dummies, ENVATOTUTS+ (May 12, 2021), 
https://code.tutsplus.com/tutorials/http-headers-for-dummies--net-8039 
[https://perma.cc/6AFS-63WS] (“The remainder of the request contains . . . various 
information about the . . . request . . . .  [I]f there was a referring [URL], that would have been 
in the [request] too.”). 
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might not otherwise have access to.30  Advertisers can store and identify this 
duplicate user data.31 
Internet users argue that the code generating a duplicate GET request 
intercepts communications between internet users and the websites that the 
internet users visit.32  This redirects a cacophony of user data to the 
advertisers.33  Advertisers respond that the internet users’ GET requests sent 
to websites generate a concerto of exempt GET requests intended for the 
digital advertisers.34  These additional GET requests are necessary in order 
to assemble websites built on the advertisers’ content.35 
If internet users are correct, digital advertisers may have accessed a 
communication between users and websites as an eavesdropper.36  If that is 
so, advertisers are one step closer to wiretap liability.37  If advertisers are 
correct, a duplicate GET request creates an entirely new communication 
between users and advertisers.38  As a consequence, the new communication 
would be exempt and the duplicate user data legally insignificant.39 
From a statutory perspective, internet users and advertisers disagree about 
whether the Wiretap Act’s party exception should apply to the duplicate GET 
requests that the digital advertisers generate.40  According to the Wiretap 
Act’s party exception, eavesdroppers are liable for interception while parties 
to a communication are not.41  Circuit courts disagree regarding whether the 
 
 30. Id.; see also Forrester, 512 F.3d at 511 n.6 (“[Capturing] URLs would also divulge 
the particular articles . . . viewed.”); In re Application of U.S. for A Pen Reg., 396 F. Supp. 
2d 45, 49 (D. Mass. 2005). 
 31. In re DoubleClick Inc. Priv. Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(establishing that cookies can retain GET data). 
 32. See generally Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 44–48, In re Facebook, Inc. Internet 
Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 17-17486), 2018 WL 313496, at *44–48 
(arguing in favor of a prima facie claim of unlawful wiretap interception in GET litigation). 
 33. See id. 
 34. Answering Brief of Defendant-Appellee Google, Inc. at 5–6, In re Google Inc. Cookie 
Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2015) (No. 13-4300), 2014 WL 
1413954, at *5–6. (“[S]ending of [information contained within a GET request] is inherent to 
the Internet browsing process . . . .”). 
 35. Websites are assembled from content found elsewhere on the internet; GET requests 
assemble the content in one place. Id. 
 36. See In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 608 (9th Cir. 2020) 
(reserving judgment on the other elements of a successful wiretap claim but declining to 
exempt the defendant from interception liability as a matter of law). 
 37. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (prohibiting the intentional interception of “any . . . 
electronic communication”). 
 38. In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 143 (3d Cir. 
2015) (finding that an intended recipient of a duplicate communication becomes a party to that 
communication and cannot be liable for a Wiretap Act violation). 
 39. Id. 
 40. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d); In re Google Inc., 806 F.3d at 143 (assessing whether the 
Wiretap Act’s party exception applies where a defendant allegedly intercepted data via GET 
request). 
 41. Warden v. Kahn, 160 Cal. Rptr. 473, 475 (Ct. App. 1979) (finding wiretap interception 
liability for eavesdroppers but not for parties); In re Facebook, 956 F.3d at 607 (confirming 
that Warden properly interprets party exception applicability to eavesdroppers in the context 
of federal law because the state exception in Warden is equivalent to the federal exception). 
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party exception applies to duplicate GET requests.42  Advertisers and users 
are left asking if duplicate GET requests are evidence of unlawful 
interception or legally exempt.43 
This Note focuses on the party exception to the Wiretap Act44 and analyzes 
whether a digital advertiser who receives a duplicate GET request containing 
the same data as another GET request is potentially liable under the Wiretap 
Act or legally exempt under the Wiretap Act’s statutory party exception.45 
Part I examines the emergence of wiretap surveillance, the legislative 
history of federal wiretap protections, and the extension of those protections 
to electronic communications.  Part I further considers a prima facie Wiretap 
Act claim and the statutory liability exceptions available to wiretap 
defendants. 
Part II provides an in-depth analysis of the party exception to the Wiretap 
Act.  It describes a typical party analysis by identifying two paths to party 
status—affirmative acts and recipient status.  It also considers two other 
factors that can influence a typical party analysis—a recipient’s behavior and 
how a court defines the scope of a protected communication. 
Part III examines the circuit split on duplicate GET requests and the party 
exception.  First, it considers the Third Circuit’s decision concluding that the 
party exception applied.  Then, it highlights First and Seventh Circuit 
decisions that established doctrine for a contrary approach.  Finally, it 
reviews the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of duplicate GET requests in a decision 
in which the court held that the party exception did not apply. 
Part IV contends that advertisers that receive duplicate GET requests are 
ineligible for the party exception.  It argues that when a duplicate GET 
request contains the same user data as another GET request, the shared data 
should be the focus of a court’s party analysis.  Then, Part IV suggests that 
direct receipt of a GET request cannot properly decide party status.  Part IV 
concludes that when a duplicate GET request’s data is analyzed, advertisers 
are ineligible for a party exception. 
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF WIRETAPPING AND WIRETAP PROTECTIONS 
Part I.A details the origins of wiretapping and the legislative response 
prohibiting the practice of wiretapping.  Part I.B examines the extension of 
wiretap protections to electronic communications.  Part I.C identifies the 
statutory elements of a wiretap violation.  Part I.D highlights statutory 
exceptions to wiretap liability, including the party exception. 
 
 42. Compare In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 608 (9th Cir. 
2020) (finding that the party exception did not apply to GET request litigation), with In re 
Google Inc., 806 F.3d at 145 (finding the party exception did apply).  See generally Brianna 
Vollman, Cookie Monster:  Facebook Sued Under Wiretap Act, U. CIN. L. REV. (June 2, 
2020), https://uclawreview.org/2020/06/02/cookie-monster-facebook-sued-under-wiretap-act 
[https://perma.cc/3UKJ-3B7P] (outlining the circuit split regarding GET request litigation 
detailed in this Note). 
 43. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 44. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. 
 45. See supra notes 36–42 and accompanying text. 
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A.  Emergence of Wiretapping and the Legislative Response 
When the telegraph was invented in 1844, it allowed parties to send and 
receive messages across long distances.46  Soon thereafter, telegrams were 
routinely intercepted by splicing telegraph wires and intercepting the 
messages contained within.47 
State law enforcement began wiretapping telegrams and telephones in 
order to aid in criminal investigations; the process of intercepting these 
communications became a useful alternative to paying criminal informants.48  
By 1938, government and private wiretapping had proliferated, and public 
outcry had grown, but federal law did not prohibit wiretap interception.49  In 
these early days of wiretap interception, disclosing information obtained by 
wiretap was prohibited, but wiretap interception itself was not.50  The U.S. 
Supreme Court clarified the legality of wiretapping in Katz v. United States.51  
Katz prohibited government wiretaps when the wiretap would violate Fourth 
Amendment protections against unlawful searches and seizures.52 
In quick order, Congress enacted the first substantive federal protections 
against private wiretapping in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 196853 (“Omnibus Act”).  In addition to outlining procedures for 
government wiretapping that complied with the Katz ruling, the Omnibus Act 
prohibited private actors from intercepting “any wire . . . communication.”54  
The Omnibus Act treated private surveillance differently than government 
surveillance and found that private surveillance had “little [legal] 
justification.”55  Accordingly, the Omnibus Act implemented a “blanket 
prohibition” outlawing private wiretapping—thus protecting wire and oral 
communications.56 
 
 46. Alex Markels, Timeline:  Wiretaps’ Use and Abuse, NPR (Dec. 20, 2005, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5061834 [https://perma.cc/3H43-
VXLD]. 
 47. Hereinafter, “wiretapping” is used to refer to the process of interception. Michael 
Pollak, A Short History of Wiretapping, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/01/nyregion/a-short-history-of-wiretapping.html 
[https://perma.cc/E36D-29QD] (describing the interception of telegrams by wiretap). 
 48. Meyer Berger, Tapping the Wires, NEW YORKER (June 18, 1938), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1938/06/18/tapping-the-wires 
[https://perma.cc/7S8E-PS2Q]. 
 49. Id. (“[L]awyers . . . have worked hard for federal legislation against wire-tapping, but 
their efforts have always failed.”). 
 50. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 605, 48 Stat. 1064, 1103–04 
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605) (prohibiting the disclosure of wiretapped 
communications). 
 51. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 52. See id. at 353. 
 53. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.). 
 54. Id. § 2511, 82 Stat. at 213. 
 55. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 69 (1968) (“Virtually all concede that the use of 
wiretapping . . . by private unauthorized hands has little justification where communications 
are intercepted without the consent of one of the participants.”). 
 56. Id. at 91. 
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That said, the “blanket prohibition” included caveats.  The Omnibus Act 
introduced important statutory exceptions—including the party exception—
that remain in effect today.57  The party exception provided that, “[i]t shall 
not be unlawful . . . for a person . . . to intercept a wire or oral communication 
where such person is a party to the communication.”58 
B.  Updating Wiretap Protections for Modern Technologies 
Despite these newfound statutory protections, the Omnibus Act did not 
account for the development of technologies that changed how people 
communicate with one another.  The Omnibus Act was concerned with oral 
conversations that were intercepted using recording devices59 and oftentimes 
transmitted greater distances using telephone lines60 and via radio 
communications.61  By 1986, new technology enabled wireless telephone 
conversations via cellular technology and non-oral electronic communication 
via the internet’s transmission of data.62  The fledgling internet allowed 
companies to transmit company data digitally and enabled individuals to 
communicate using email.63  Neither form of communication was protected 
by existing federal law.64 
Acknowledging this gap in federal wiretap protections, Congress enacted 
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act65 (“Wiretap Act”).  The Wiretap 
Act amended the Omnibus Act to clarify and expand “privacy protections 
and standards” by addressing modern technologies.66  The Wiretap Act 
included federal protections for electronic communications.67  The party 
exception reappeared in the Wiretap Act.  Intercepting an “electronic 
communication where such person is a party to the communication” was 
legally exempt according to the Wiretap Act.68  The Wiretap Act’s legislative 
 
 57. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d). 
 58. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 2511, 82 Stat. 
197, 214. 
 59. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 94–95 (detailing congressional concern with disguised devices 
used to intercept oral communications). 
 60. Id. at 92 (highlighting the statute’s prohibition of wiretap interception leveraging the 
use of telephone line surveillance). 
 61. Id. (detailing the statute’s equivalent prohibition of wiretap interception leveraging 
the use of radio communications). 
 62. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 2 (“Today we have large-scale electronic mail operations, 
computer-to-computer data transmissions, cellular and cordless telephones, paging devices, 
and video teleconferencing.”). 
 63. Id. at 8. 
 64. Id. at 5 (conceding that no federal law protected modern telecommunications like the 
internet from wiretap interception). 
 65. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 
(1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
 66. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1. 
 67. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a); see also In re Matter of Search Warrant for [redacted].com, 
248 F. Supp. 3d 970, 974 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (surveying the legislative purpose of the Wiretap 
Act). 
 68. H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 85 (1986). 
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history reveals that Congress remained concerned with unauthorized private 
persons accessing “communications to which they were not a party.”69 
C.  Outlining a Prima Facie Wiretap Act Claim 
This Note analyzes whether the Wiretap Act’s party exception applies to a 
duplicate GET request received by advertisers when that duplicate request 
shares data with GET request sent between users and websites.70  For clarity, 
this Note first considers the elements of a prima facie Wiretap Act claim. 
The Wiretap Act prohibits the intentional interception of an electronic 
communication.71  In order to plead a successful wiretap claim, a plaintiff 
must allege that the defendant “(1) intentionally (2) intercepted . . . (3) the 
contents of (4) an electronic communication, (5) using a device.”72 
Interception is intentional when the defendant had knowledge of the 
interception or it was the defendant’s conscious objective to intercept the 
communication.73  Interception is unintentional when the defendant 
intercepts a communication by mistake or by accident.74  The circuit split 
discussed in this Note addresses digital advertisers allegedly embedding code 
on websites; that code ultimately generates the duplicate GET requests.75  
This indicates intentional conduct, whether or not wiretap liability exists. 
Interception also requires the acquisition of a communication’s contents.76  
Content is defined as the “information concerning the substance, purport, or 
meaning of that communication.”77  Acquiring a GET request can meet this 
requirement when it contains URL data identifying a user’s queried search 
terms78 or the particular web page users visit.79 
 
 69. Id. at 19. 
 70. See supra notes 32–45 and accompanying text. 
 71. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a). 
 72. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., No. 17-1775, 2019 WL 8886485, at *5 (D.N.J. 
Aug. 21, 2019). 
 73. In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 23 (1st Cir. 2003) (“An ‘intentional’ state of 
mind . . .  [can mean] the result of one’s conduct if such conduct or result is one’s conscious 
objective.” (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 23 (1986))); Backhaut v. Apple, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 
3d 1033, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (holding that Apple’s knowledge qualified as intent). 
 74. Backhaut, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 1044 (“Interceptions that are the product of inadvertence 
or mistake are insufficient . . . .”). 
 75. See In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 596 (9th Cir. 2020) 
(“Facebook facilitated [the tracking of users] by embedding third-party plug-ins on . . . web 
pages.). 
 76. Zak v. Bose Corp., No. 17-CV-02928, 2020 WL 2762552, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 27, 
2020) (outlining prima facie elements). 
 77. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Boonstra, 302 F. Supp. 2d 822, 827 (W.D. Mich. 2004) (quoting 
18 U.S.C. § 2510(8)). 
 78. See In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 139 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (considering the content element in GET request litigation and concluding “we are 
persuaded that—at a minimum—some queried URLs qualify”). 
 79. Id. at 138; United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 511 n.6 (9th Cir. 2008) (“A 
URL . . . identifies the particular document within a website that a person views and thus 
reveals much more information about the person’s Internet activity.”); see supra notes 26–29 
and accompanying text (confirming that GET requests can contain these URLs). 
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An “electronic communication” is “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, 
images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in 
part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical 
system.”80  The data exchanged between users and websites qualifies.81  The 
Third and Ninth Circuits did not question a GET request’s status as an 
electronic communication.82  Accordingly, this Note does not question a 
GET request’s status as an electronic communication. 
Finally, a communication must be intercepted using “a device.”83  The 
Third Circuit was unable to identify a device that could intercept the user 
data of a GET request sent between users and websites.84  Other courts 
recognize that the device is a second communication that contains duplicate 
data or—at a minimum—that the web servers facilitating a second 
communication qualify as the device.85  This Note agrees:  a duplicate GET 
request powered by the defendant’s web servers is the device.86 
D.  Statutory Exceptions to Wiretap Act Liability 
A prima facie wiretap claim must also account for the Wiretap Act’s 
statutory exceptions.  This includes exceptions for law enforcement87 and 
interception as an incident in the ordinary course of business.88  Notably, 
consent to interception can exempt the accused from liability.89  If an internet 
user communicates with a website and the website consents to an advertiser 
intercepting the communication, an advertiser is free from liability.90  For 
that reason, consent can exempt an advertiser from liability.91 
 
 80. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12). 
 81. See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 876 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 82. See generally In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 
2020); In re Google Inc., 806 F.3d 125. 
 83. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4). 
 84. See In re Google, 806 F.3d at 141–42. 
 85. See In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2003) (“[I]t is clear that Pharmatrak 
relied on devices such as its web servers to capture information from users.”); see also Vasil 
v. Kiip, Inc., No. 16-CV-09937, 2018 WL 1156328, at *6 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (concluding that 
the defendant has employed an “artifice” to receive the allegedly intercepted 
communications). 
 86. See infra Part IV.A. 
 87. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c). 
 88. Id. § 2511(2)(a)(i).  Incidentally, a federal district court in the Northern District of 
California rejected an ordinary course of business exception for a wiretap claim involving 
GET requests. Brown v. Google L.L.C., No. 20-CV-03664, 2021 WL 949372, at *15 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 12, 2021) (“Sending a duplicate GET request to Google neither facilitates nor is 
incidental [to] the communication that Plaintiffs allege was intercepted—in this case, the 
communication between the user’s computer and the website.”). 
 89. In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 19–20. 
 90. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (“It shall not be unlawful . . . where one of the parties to the 
communication has given prior consent . . . unless such communication is intercepted for the 
purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act . . . .”). 
 91. See generally In re DoubleClick Inc. Priv. Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(exempting liability with consent). 
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Consent is not foolproof.  An eavesdropper may fail to get consent from 
the websites that users visit.92  If an eavesdropper asks for consent, they may 
fail to adequately disclose the extent of data collection, rendering consent 
invalid.93  Each statutory exception is analyzed on its own merit.94  Circuit 
courts still disagree on whether the party exception applies to duplicate GET 
requests.95  As a result, party exception applicability remains relevant and is 
thus this Note’s focus.  According to that exception, a person who intercepts 
an “electronic communication where such person is a party to the 
communication” is exempt from Wiretap Act liability as a matter of law.96 
II.  NAVIGATING THE WIRETAP ACT’S PARTY EXCEPTION ANALYSIS 
Part II outlines how courts conduct a party exception analysis.  Part II.A 
identifies two ways a defendant can become an exempt party.  This includes 
affirmative acts in Part II.A.1 or recipient status in Part II.A.2.  Part II.B 
distinguishes between intended and unintended recipients using two 
analytical methods.  Part II.B.1 analyzes manifestations of sender intent.  Part 
II.B.2 analyzes a communication’s intended destination.  Part II.C highlights 
how a recipient’s behavior can also distinguish between intended and 
unintended recipients.  This recipient behavior includes manufactured 
recipients, discussed in Part II.C.1, and surreptitious listeners, discussed in 
Part II.C.2.  Part II.D examines how the scope of a communication affects 
party status. 
A.  Identifying Parties:  Affirmative Acts and Recipients 
The parties to a communication are exempt from liability under the 
Wiretap Act.97  Digital advertisers can become an exempt party through 
affirmative acts98 or recipient status.99 
1.  Path One:  Affirmative Acts May Indicate Party Status 
The Second Circuit held in Caro v. Weintraub100 that a defendant’s 
affirmative acts can grant exempt party status under the Wiretap Act.101  
 
 92. See In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 20. 
 93. Brown v. Google L.L.C., No. 20-CV-03664, 2021 WL 949372, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 
12, 2021) (“[E]ven assuming that Google has established that websites generally consented to 
the interception of their communications with users, Google does not demonstrate that 
websites consented to . . . interception of communications with users who were in private 
browsing mode.”). 
 94. See Ali v. Douglas Cable Commc’ns, 929 F. Supp. 1362, 1376–77 (D. Kan. 1996) 
(analyzing two statutory exceptions distinctly). 
 95. See supra notes 36–42 and accompanying text. 
 96. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d). 
 97. Id. (“It shall not be unlawful . . . where such person is a party to the 
communication . . . .”). 
 98. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 99. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 100. 618 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 101. See id. at 97–98. 
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Caro involved a conversation across a kitchen table.102  The defendant 
engaged in conversation and recorded the exchange with his phone.103  The 
Caro court had to decide whether the recording was wiretap interception or 
exempt because the defendant was a party to the conversation.104 
In order to identify the parties, the court in Caro analyzed the defendant’s 
behavior.  The court held that the defendant was a party because of his 
affirmative acts:  namely, participation in the conversation.105  By 
participating in the conversation, the defendant was deemed an exempt 
party.106  This is consistent with the legislative history for wiretap laws.107  
By this metric, participation can accord exempt party status.108 
The reach of affirmative acts extends well beyond the kitchen table.  In 
Zak v. Bose,109 the court considered a mobile application that allowed users 
to play music and view information about the users’ selected songs.110  By 
design, the Bose application responded to users’ song requests in order to 
play the songs and display the information expected.111  In Zak, active 
participation became the cornerstone of a party status analysis.112  By virtue 
of the Bose application’s functionality, the court concluded that Bose was a 
“known participant” in the communication, and this established Bose as an 
exempt party.113 
Participation in a communication may also be framed in terms of sender 
and recipient.114  In United States v. Szymuszkiewicz,115 the Seventh Circuit 
analyzed email transmissions by describing the movement of email 
communications as those that were sent from “sender to recipient.”116  This 
terminology enabled the court to conclude, on other grounds, that the 
defendant was best characterized as neither.  Instead, the defendant was a 
 
 102. Id. at 96. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 97–98 (reviewing de novo the district court’s ruling that the defendant was a 
party to the conversation at issue). 
 105. Id. at 98 (noting that the defendant “spoke up a few times urging [Caro] to continue” 
and determining that “[t]hose facts [we]re sufficient to establish that David was a party to the 
conversation”). 
 106. Id. at 97 (“[A] party to the conversation is one who takes part in the 
conversation . . . .”). 
 107. See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 94 (1968) (“‘[P]arty’ would mean the person actually 
participating in the communication.”). 
 108. See id. 
 109. No. 17-CV-02928, 2019 WL 1437909 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2019). 
 110. Id. at *1. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at *3 (“[T]he relevant inquiry is whether the defendant is a participant in the 
conversation, as opposed to a non-participant that uses other means to gain access . . . .”). 
 113. Id. at *3–4. (finding that receiving and displaying user media was the primary function 
of the application and this established that the defendant was eligible for party status). 
 114. See, e.g., In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 
143 (3d Cir. 2015) (supporting this framework by identifying paradigmatic parties as “the 
speaker and/or sender, and at least one intended recipient”). 
 115. 622 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 116. Id. at 705 (analyzing defendant’s defense on other grounds by framing a 
communication as between a sender and a recipient). 
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“spy,” who accessed “nonpublic” emails and was thus subject to the Wiretap 
Act’s unlawful interception liability.117 
2.  Path Two:  Recipients May Qualify for Party Status 
The Szymuszkiewicz analysis identified two parties to a communication:  
the sender and the recipient of an email.118  Recipient status is the second 
path to becoming a party.  In this view, a party also includes the person to 
whom, or the entity at which, a conversation is directed.119  Protected 
communications will always include at least one sender and one recipient.120  
Without at least one identifiable sender and recipient, there might not be a 
protected communication at all.121 
People v. Herrington,122 an Illinois state court case, is illustrative in this 
regard:  in a simple conversation, words are spoken by one person and 
directed toward another.123  Herrington held that the person on the receiving 
end of a conversation can record without liability.124  For example, an 
internet user might visit The New York Times’s online website.125  Via 
transmission of electronic data, the internet user’s computer is speaking and 
directing this conversation to the website.126  Thus, the website becomes an 
exempt party because the website is the recipient of the user’s 
communication.127 
In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation128 and Allen v. Quicken 
Loans Inc.129 confirm that in the sphere of electronic communications, the 
websites that users intend to communicate with are prime examples of 
exempt recipients.  By navigating to the Nickelodeon website owned by 
 
 117. See id. at 705, 707 (implying that the defendant qualifies as neither sender nor 
recipient by straying from the sender and recipient terminology to label the defendant as a 
“spy” and concluding that the defendant had accessed “nonpublic” emails). 
 118. See supra notes 116–17 and accompanying text. 
 119. See People v. Herrington, 645 N.E.2d 957, 958–59 (Ill. 1994). 
 120. In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 143 (3d Cir. 
2015) (concluding that a communication will always include at least one sender and one 
recipient). 
 121. See Jurgens v. Build.com, Inc., No. 4:17-CV-00783, 2017 WL 5277679, at *6 (E.D. 
Mo. Nov. 13, 2017) (noting that if a plaintiff cannot identify an alleged communication’s 
recipient, then no communication exists at all for Wiretap Act protection). 
 122. 645 N.E.2d 957 (Ill. 1994). 
 123. See id. at 958–59; see also Vasil v. Kiip, Inc., No. 16-CV-09937, 2018 WL 1156328, 
at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2018) (affirming that Herrington’s Illinois state law interpretation of 
party status “comports with the meaning of party under the Wiretap Act” and with the Third 
Circuit’s interpretation.). 
 124. Id. at 959 (holding that a party can record a conversation where the recording was of 
a conversation the party would otherwise hear by virtue of having the conversation at all). 
 125. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text. 
 126. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text. 
 127. See In re DoubleClick Inc. Priv. Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(finding that the websites users visit are parties to the digital communications sent from these 
users). 
 128. 827 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 129. No. 17-12352, 2018 WL 5874088 (D.N.J. Nov. 9, 2018). 
2021] CACOPHONY OR CONCERTO? 965 
Viacom, users made Viacom a party to the electronic communication.130  
Likewise, the plaintiff in Allen admitted that an allegedly intercepted 
electronic communication took place on Quicken’s website; this admission 
established that Quicken was a party to the communication.131 
In sum, defendants can claim party status via affirmative acts including 
participation as the sender or recipient of a communication.132  Claiming 
recipient status may be the preferred path for digital advertisers generating 
duplicate GET requests and directing this data toward themselves.133  
Advertisers may argue that they are the recipients of users’ GET requests and 
recipients are exempt parties per the party exception.134 
B.  Distinguishing Between Intended and Unintended Recipients 
However, not all recipients qualify as parties.  Intended recipients qualify 
for party status, but unintended recipients do not.135  Therefore, it becomes 
important to determine whether digital advertisers are intended or unintended 
recipients.136 
The person someone intends to talk to is an intended recipient.137  A 
mobile application a user intends to engage with qualifies, too.138  So do the 
websites a user intends to visit.139  Despite the various examples of intended 
recipients, courts may disagree over how to identify an intended recipient.  
Some courts focus on manifestations of sender intent.140  Other courts ask 
whether a communication reached its intended destination.141  Part IV 
 
 130. See In re Nickelodeon Consumer, 827 F.3d at 267, 274 (establishing that the 
communications occurred on “Viacom’s websites” and then deciding outright that Viacom 
was a party). 
 131. See Allen, 2018 WL 5874088, at *4 (“[A]ll relevant communications occurred on 
Quicken’s Website, making Quicken the intended recipient (and a party) to the 
communications.”). 
 132. See Caro v. Weintraub, 618 F.3d 94, 97–98 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Allen, 2018 WL 
5874088, at *4 (agreeing that defendants were eligible for a party exception). 
 133. See Answering Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 5–6, In re Google Inc. Cookie 
Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2015) (No. 13-4300), 2014 WL 
1413954, *5–6. 
 134. Id. at *35–36. 
 135. Compare Crowley v. CyberSource Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1269 (N.D. Cal. 
2001) (holding that the defendant was a party to the communication because it “merely 
received the information transferred to it”), with Backhaut v. Apple, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 
1042–43 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (denying a motion to dismiss where a complaint alleged messages 
were not addressed to Apple). 
 136. Compare In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 2020), 
with In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 137. See People v. Herrington, 645 N.E.2d 957, 959 (Ill. 1994) (quoting Bender v. Board 
of Fire & Police Comm’rs, 539 N.E. 2d 234, 236 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (affirming that when a 
statement is “made or directed” toward someone, that person becomes an exempt party). 
 138. See supra notes 109–13 and accompanying text. 
 139. See In re DoubleClick Inc. Priv. Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 513–14 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(concluding, as a preliminary matter, that the websites associated with an advertiser are parties 
to a communication capable of consenting to advertiser interception). 
 140. See infra notes 142–57, 170–73 and accompanying text. 
 141. See infra notes 158–69 and accompanying text. 
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analyzes data in an advertiser’s duplicate GET request using both 
approaches, so both approaches are considered here. 
1.  Analyzing Manifestations of Sender Intent 
A federal district court in the Northern District of Illinois, in Vasil v. Kiip, 
Inc.,142 identified the intended recipient by crediting manifestations of sender 
intent on a motion to dismiss.  While the Vasil federal wiretap claim failed 
on other grounds, the recipient analysis was applied to an Illinois state law 
claim that defined parties identically to the federal Wiretap Act’s definition 
of an exempt party.143  The court asked who the sender of a communication 
intended to communicate with—if anyone—and then asked if that 
plaintiff-sender intent included the defendant.144  At the dismissal stage, it 
was enough that the plaintiff-senders of the communication alleged that they 
intended to communicate with no one at all.145  Hence, the senders could not 
have intended to communicate with Vasil’s defendant, and party status 
failed.146 
Likewise, in Backhaut v. Apple,147 a federal district court in the Northern 
District of California found it telling that the senders’ intended recipients 
were clearly identified.148  Senders addressed text messages to particular 
recipients, none of whom included Apple.149  In Lopez v. Apple, Inc.,150 the 
court, also in the Northern District of California, considered whether Apple 
was an intended recipient of users’ audio communications.151  Allegedly, 
user audio was inadvertently sent to Apple via Apple’s Siri virtual 
assistant.152  Though the claim failed on other grounds, the court, by 
assessing the senders’ manifestations of intent, rejected Apple’s defense that 
it was an exempt intended recipient.153 
First, on a motion to dismiss, the court credited users’ allegations that they 
did not intend to communicate with Apple.154  Second, the court inferred the 
senders’ intent:  conversations between users and their doctors, business 
 
 142. No. 16-CV-09937, 2018 WL 1156328 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2018). 
 143. Id. at *6. (defining parties under Illinois state law to match the definition as it appears 
within the Wiretap Act). 
 144. See id. 
 145. See id. (“[P]laintiffs never intended, the complaint alleges, to communicate 
information to Kiip (or anyone else) when not using the Runkeeper app, so Kiip could not 
have been a party to a communication of data . . . that Kiip engineered . . . .”). 
 146. See id. 
 147. 74 F. Supp. 3d 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 148. See id. at 1043 (crediting plaintiff’s allegation that text messages “not addressed or 
directed to Apple” was sufficient for a viable wiretap claim on a motion to dismiss). 
 149. Id. 
 150. No. 19-04577, 2021 WL 823122 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2021). 
 151. Id. at *4 (“Apple argues . . . that it has not ‘intercepted’ communications because it 
was the intended recipient.”). 
 152. Id. at *1. 
 153. Id. at *4–5. 
 154. Id. at *4 (“Plaintiffs allege that they did not intend Apple to receive their private 
communications, but that Apple ‘captured’ such communications using the software in their 
devices.  That sufficiently alleges interception.”). 
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associates, and sexual partners were intended for “doctors, business partners 
and sexual partners respectively—not Apple.”155 
In Vasil, Backhaut, and Lopez, the courts declined to extend intended 
recipient status to defendants where the senders of the communications did 
not intend for the defendants to receive the allegedly intercepted 
communications.156  At the dismissal stage, alleged sender intent was enough 
to defeat party status.157 
2.  Analyzing a Communication’s Intended Destination 
In contrast, other courts focus on a communication’s intended 
destination.158  In the Seventh Circuit’s influential United States v. Pasha159 
decision, callers intended to communicate with the criminal defendants by 
dialing a particular telephone.160  The phone call reached the telephone, but 
law enforcement—not the criminal defendants—answered the call.161  The 
court held that law enforcement had not tampered with the underlying 
communication because the call reached its intended destination:  the 
telephone.162  Law enforcement must tamper with a call on its way to an 
intended telephone in order to become an unintended recipient liable for 
interception.163 
In Jurgens v. Build.com, Inc.,164 an Eastern District of Montana case, 
Plaintiff Jurgens admitted that an electronic communication was stored on a 
computer waiting to be transmitted to the defendant’s server.165  The court 
held that the defendant must be an intended recipient.166  It did not matter 
whether Jurgens intended to actually transmit the communication.167  
According to Pasha, a court should reject liability where defendants merely 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. Vasil, 2018 WL 1156328, at *6 (finding no support for the defendant’s argument that 
“a direct, but unintended, recipient of a communication automatically becomes a party”); 
Backhaut, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 1043 (finding plaintiffs had alleged a prima facie claim because 
messages were not addressed to defendant). 
 157. See supra notes 142–56 and accompanying text. 
 158. See United States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d 193, 197–98 (7th Cir. 1964) (quoting State v. 
Carbone, 183 A.2d 1, 26 (N.J. 1962)). 
 159. 332 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1964). 
 160. See id. at 196–98. 
 161. See id. at 196. 
 162. See id. at 198 (“[T]he conversations between the callers and the agent cannot be said 
to have been intercepted.  Interception connotes a situation in which by surreptitious means a 
third party overhears a telephone conversation . . . .”). 
 163. See Carbone, 183 A.2d at 4–5. 
 164. No. 17-CV-00783, 2017 WL 5277679 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 13, 2017). 
 165. See id. at *5 (highlighting plaintiff’s admission that the communication at issue was 
for the “eventual ‘transmittal to Defendant’” (quoting Second Amended Complaint at 5, 
Jurgens v. Build.com, Inc., No. 4:17-CV-00783 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 13, 2017))). 
 166. See id. (concluding that said admission ended liability because an “intended recipient 
of such transmission is a party”). 
 167. See id. 
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answer a telephone168 rather than tamper with a communication on the way 
to its intended destination.169 
In State v. Roden,170 Washington state’s supreme court considered the 
Pasha approach and offered a persuasive rebuttal to Pasha in modern times.  
Roden declined to extend the intended destination approach to text 
messages.171  According to Roden, text messages are similar to physical mail 
where the mail’s addressee is clearly identifiable.172  The sender of a text 
message has an expectation that the text message will reach an intended 
destination which includes an intended recipient.173  Like Vasil and 
Backhaut, the intended-recipient status hinged on an identifiable intended 
recipient—not the destination alone.174 
C.  Recipient Behavior May Also Affect Party Status 
As discussed in Part II.B, courts have distinguished between intended and 
unintended recipients by analyzing manifestations of sender intent or 
analyzing whether a communication reached its intended destination 
uninterrupted.175  Some courts also subcategorize recipients based on the 
recipient’s behavior; two subcategories include manufactured recipients176 
and surreptitious listeners.177 
1.  Manufactured Recipients 
Communications can begin when someone decides to speak,178 dials a 
telephone,179 sends an email,180 or visits a website.181  Although this chain 
of events is sufficient, the recipients of data can also direct a sender to initiate 
the communication.182  This Note refers to these recipients as manufactured 
recipients. 
 
 168. See Crowley v. CyberSource Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1269 (N.D. Cal. 2001) 
(alluding to, but not citing, the Pasha line of thinking by describing an identical and 
“untenable” hypothetical where “one who picks up a telephone” is subjected to liability). 
 169. See State v. Carbone, 183 A.2d 1, 4 (N.J. 1962) (providing the foundation for Pasha’s 
paradigmatic view of interception). 
 170. 321 P.3d 1183 (Wash. 2014). 
 171. See id. (declining to extend Pasha to text messages). 
 172. Id. (“The sender addresses mail to a particular individual and reasonably expects the 
communication to be routed to and received by the addressee.”). 
 173. See id. 
 174. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 175. See supra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2. 
 176. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 177. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 178. See People v. Herrington, 645 N.E.2d 957, 958–59 (Ill. 1994). 
 179. See United States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d 193, 198 (7th Cir. 1964). 
 180. See United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701, 707 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 181. See In re Nickelodeon Consumer Priv. Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 274 (3d Cir. 2016); see 
also Allen v. Quicken Loans Inc., No. 17-12352, 2018 WL 5874088, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 9, 
2018). 
 182. See infra notes 183–92 and accompanying text. 
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For some courts, manufactured recipients are ineligible for the party 
exception.  In In re iPhone Application Litigation,183 a federal district court 
in the Northern District of California considered a plaintiff-class’s allegation 
that user data collected on iPhones and transmitted to Apple was unlawfully 
intercepted.184  Apple invoked the party exception because iPhones were 
intentionally designed to transmit user data to Apple.185  Apple argued that 
because user data was intentionally sent to Apple, Apple was an intended 
recipient and therefore an exempt party.186 
On a motion to dismiss, the court rejected this argument.187  Apple’s 
intentional software design was the very thing that allegedly enabled the 
interception.188  Apple could not point to “accused conduct” as evidence that 
it was an intended recipient eligible for a party exception.189  Likewise, in 
White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.,190 New Jersey’s federal district 
court rejected the party exception—where televisions transmitted users’ 
viewing habits—based on the defendant’s intentional software design.191  
This intentional software design supported alleged wiretap interception and 
could not create an intended recipient on a motion to dismiss.192 
2.  Surreptitious Listeners 
Courts have recognized a second subcategory of recipients ineligible for 
the party exception:  surreptitious listeners.193  Pasha imagined unlawful 
interception as the hypothetical conversation between two parties overheard 
surreptitiously by a third entity.194  Interpreting this dicta, the federal district 
court in New Jersey, in United States v. Eady,195 held that a person invisibly 
listening to a conversation was ineligible for the party exception.196  
However, not every surreptitious act creates a surreptitious listener ineligible 
for the party exception.197  In Allen, the invisible transfer of user data by 
 
 183. 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
 184. Id. at 1050 (describing Apple’s alleged collection of geolocation data from users’ 
iPhones). 
 185. Id. at 1062. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. (“Apple cannot manufacture a statutory exception through its own accused 
conduct . . . .”). 
 190. No. 17-1775, 2019 WL 8886485 (D.N.J. Aug. 21, 2019). 
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Quicken was insignificant.198  No matter how surreptitious, Quicken was 
already an intended recipient of the communication and could freely transfer 
the user data surreptitiously.199 
For that reason, a surreptitious listener must intrude upon a communication 
that could exist without the surreptitious listener’s participation.200  This 
standard is met when a court identifies the sender and intended recipient and 
then determines that the surreptitious listener fits into neither category.201 
D.  Party Status Also Depends on the Scope of a Communication 
For all the work courts do to identify the parties to a communication, 
sometimes analyzing the right communications is what matters most.  In 
White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., the New Jersey federal district 
court was confronted with two communications each with different 
identifiable parties.202  The first communication was between television users 
and content providers, including video streaming services like Netflix.203  
Here, users requested videos from their televisions by directing the 
televisions to communicate with the content providers.204 
In the second communication, Samsung’s embedded software in the users’ 
televisions created a transmission between users and Samsung’s servers.205  
The second communication allegedly sent Samsung data about the videos 
users requested from the content providers.206  Viewed in isolation, Samsung 
was a party to the second communication sent directly from the users to 
Samsung.207 
However, the court rejected this isolated analysis.208  Taken together, the 
second communication could be evidence that the first communication 
between users and content providers was being intercepted and sent to 
Samsung.209  The second communication conveyed to Samsung the duplicate 
data contained in a communication between users and content providers; user 
viewing habits sent from user to content provider.210  Party status in a second 
communication could not protect Samsung if a second communication 
 
 198. See 2018 WL 5874088, at *5 (concluding that once Quicken was a party to the 
communication, consent allowed Quicken to facilitate interception even if the behavior was 
unknown to its users). 
 199. Id. 
 200. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., No. 17-1775, 2019 WL 8886485, at *6 (D.N.J. 
Aug. 21, 2019) (finding party status unavailing where surreptitious software intercepted 
transmissions between content providers and customers’ TVs). 
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 202. See id. at *5. 
 203. See id. at *1, *5. 
 204. See id. 
 205. See id. at *6. 
 206. See id. at *1. 
 207. See id. at *5. 
 208. See id. at *6. 
 209. See id. at *5. 
 210. Id. at *6 (“Plaintiffs allege that Defendants surreptitiously installed software on their 
televisions that permitted Defendants to track their communications with streaming services, 
their cable providers, or other content providers . . . .”). 
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intercepted data in a communication between users and content providers 
which Samsung was not a party to.211 
As a result, litigants and courts can determine whether party status in one 
communication is dispositive or distracting from another communication that 
should decide liability.212  Similarly, a federal district court in the Northern 
District of California, in In re iPhone Application Litigation, rejected Apple’s 
focus on communications sent directly from users’ iPhones to Apple.213  
Looking at these communications in isolation could suggest that Apple was 
an intended recipient.214  Instead, the court widened the scope of its analysis 
and asked whether Apple was a party to earlier, but related, communications 
sent between users’ iPhones and cellular towers.215 
III.  THIRD AND NINTH CIRCUITS REACH OPPOSITE RESULTS ON THE PARTY 
EXCEPTION IN REGARD TO DUPLICATE GET REQUESTS 
Part III examines how the Third and Ninth Circuits applied the party 
exception to a duplicate GET request.  Part III.A considers the Third Circuit 
case, In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy,216 in which the 
Third Circuit concluded that the party exception applied to a duplicate GET 
request.217  Part III.B highlights decisions in the First, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits, which create a circuit split with the Third Circuit.  Part III.B.1 
analyzes cases in the First and Seventh Circuits where the courts concluded 
that two communications containing duplicate data are indicia of wiretap 
interception.218  Part III.B.2 reviews the Ninth Circuit decision, In re 
Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litigation,219 which held that the party 
exception did not apply to a duplicate GET request.220 
A.  Third Circuit:  Digital Advertisers Are Exempt Parties 
In 2015, the Third Circuit considered the wiretap liability of digital 
advertisers, including Google.221  A class of plaintiffs sued for the alleged 
 
 211. See id. at *5 (“[W]hile Defendants are parties to the latter communication, it is the 
former that Plaintiffs allege was unlawfully intercepted.  Because Defendants are not a party 
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 212. Compare In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig., 263 F. Supp. 3d 836, 844 (N.D. Cal. 
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 213. See id. at 1062 (rejecting Apple’s isolated focus on a single communication flowing 
directly between the users’ iPhones and Apple’s servers). 
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 215. Id. (finding that the relevant communication flowed from users’ iPhones to cellular 
towers before the alleged interception). 
 216. 806 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 217. See id. at 142–43. 
 218. See generally United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2010); In re 
Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 219. 956 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 220. Id. at 608. 
 221. See In re Google, 806 F.3d at 130, 133. 
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interception of their electronic communications.222  The suits were 
consolidated into In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy 
Litigation.  The plaintiff-class represented the sort of internet users 
mentioned throughout this Note.223  Users visited websites delivered via GET 
requests.224  On arrival, websites displayed advertisements.225  
Advertisements were served via a duplicate GET request generated when 
users reached a website.226  The request was duplicate insofar as it contained 
data identical to that found in the original request between user and 
website.227  Advertisers retained user data and assigned an identity to track 
users’ online behavior.228 
On appeal, the internet users challenged the district court’s dismissal of 
the wiretap interception claim.229  Contrary to the district court,230 the Third 
Circuit found that the digital advertiser’s wiretap liability turned on whether 
or not the advertisers were exempt parties.231  The digital advertisers argued 
that they were intended recipients of the GET request communication and 
thus qualified for the party exception.232 
Like White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. and In re iPhone 
Application Litigation, the Third Circuit began its party exception analysis 
by asking which communication controlled the digital advertisers’ party 
status.233  In the internet users’ view, advertisers intercepted communications 
between users and the websites they visited (e.g., the GET request from users 
to website).234  The Third Circuit disagreed, isolating its analysis to the 
duplicate GET request between users and advertisers.235 
The court supported its conclusion with three points.  First, the duplicate 
GET request used to serve digital advertisements and collect user data flowed 
directly from the users’ web browsers to the advertisers.236  This duplicate 
 
 222. See id. 
 223. See generally In re Nickelodeon Consumer Priv. Litig., 827 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2016); 
Allen v. Quicken Loans Inc., No. 17-12352, 2018 WL 5874088 (D.N.J. Nov. 9, 2018). 
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 231. See id. 
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 235. See id. at 142. 
 236. Id. at 140–41. 
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GET request was not acquired on its way from users to websites.237  Second, 
direct receipt of the duplicate GET request meant that the advertisers had “no 
need” to capture identical data from the first GET request between the users 
and the websites.238  Advertisers had the “information . . . anyway” from the 
duplicate GET request.239  Third, the court found that the internet users had 
not identified a device that could intercept the users’ first GET request.240 
Once the court concluded that the relevant communication flowed directly 
from the users to advertisers, the court proceeded to identify the parties to 
that communication.241  In line with the sender and recipient framework, the 
court concluded that any communication includes a sender and one or more 
intended recipients.242  By making up the second half of the communication, 
an intended recipient is an exempt party.243 
Applying this logic, digital advertisers were the intended recipients of the 
duplicate GET request because the requests were transmitted directly to 
advertisers.244  This is similar to the logic applied in Pasha.245  The duplicate 
GET request was intended to reach the advertisers’ servers and it reached that 
destination uninterrupted.246  Accordingly, the advertisers were exempt 
parties.247  At this point, even if the digital advertisers surreptitiously stored 
data, they did so as exempt parties.248 
The fact that Google was a manufactured recipient was also deemed 
legally insignificant.249  Google’s embedded code “circumvented” a web 
browser’s settings in order to generate the duplicate GET request.250  The 
court held that Google’s behavior could manufacture recipient status by 
gaining “entrance to a conversation through a fraud” without limiting 
Google’s access to the party exception once the transmission occurred.251 
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 240. Id. at 141–42. 
 241. Id. at 142–43. 
 242. Id. at 143. 
 243. See id. (“[T]he intended recipient of a communication is necessarily one of its 
parties . . . .”). 
 244. See id. at 142. 
 245. See United States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d 193, 198 (7th Cir. 1964) (quoting State v. 
Carbone, 183 A.2d 1, 26 (N.J. 1962)). 
 246. See In re Google, 806 F.3d at 140 (characterizing the GET request as a direct 
transmission from users to advertisers). 
 247. Id. at 145. 
 248. Id. at 143. 
 249. See id. (“Though we are no doubt troubled by the various deceits alleged in the 
complaint, we do not agree that a deceit upon the sender affects the presumptive 
non-liability . . . .”). 
 250. Id. at 132. 
 251. Id. at 143. 
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B.  A GET Request Circuit Split:  The First, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits 
Disagree with the Third Circuit 
Part III.B.1 examines two First and Seventh Circuit decisions important to 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking 
Litigation.  The First and Seventh Circuit decisions held that two 
communications containing duplicate data are indicia of wiretap interception.  
Part III.B.2 considers how the Ninth Circuit relied on this logic, rejected the 
Third Circuit approach, and concluded that duplicate GET requests are 
ineligible for a party exception. 
1.  First and Seventh Circuits:  Duplicate Communications Are Indicia of 
Wiretap Interception 
By the time the Third Circuit accorded digital advertisers party status in 
relation to their duplicate GET requests, the First and Seventh Circuits had 
already set out doctrine for a contrary approach.252  In the First Circuit, the 
court considered whether one communication should be analyzed in isolation 
even though it contained duplicate data from another communication.253  
Isolated, the communication containing duplicate data could grant 
defendants status as an exempt party so long as they were intended 
recipients—just as it would in the Third Circuit.254 
This is precisely what Pharmatrak argued in the First Circuit’s 2003 case, 
In re Pharmatrak, Inc.255  Pharmatrak sold software to pharmaceutical 
clients, allowing the clients to track users’ behavior on the clients’ 
websites.256  Unknown to the clients and users alike, Pharmatrak collected 
user data in a variety of ways.257  In one instance, Pharmatrak duplicated the 
data from communications sent from users’ web browsers to the client 
websites.258  User data was then sent back to Pharmatrak using a second 
communication.259  Pharmatrak argued that these were two unique 
communications:  one communication between users and client websites, and 
a second communication between users and Pharmatrak.260 
The First Circuit rejected this argument.  Notably, the user data captured 
by Pharmatrak was identical to the data generated in the original 
communication between users and the clients’ websites.261  The court noted 
 
 252. See generally United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2010); In re 
Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003). 
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that unauthorized interception under the Wiretap Act did not require 
acquisition of the “same communication”—only a communication’s 
contents.262  For the First Circuit, this established wiretap liability.263  It was 
enough to intercept a communication’s contents even if the contents were 
transmitted using a second communication.264 
Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. 
Szymuszkiewicz confirmed that wiretap interception could include multiple 
communications tied together because the communications’ contents were 
duplicate.  Szymuszkiewicz allegedly spied on Infusino by tampering with 
Infusino’s email settings so that Infusino’s emails were automatically 
forwarded from Infusino’s inbox to Szymuszkiewicz’s computer.265  This 
meant that there were two communications containing duplicate data:  emails 
Infusino received and duplicate emails forwarded from Infusino to 
Szymuszkiewicz.266  According to Szymuszkiewicz, there was no 
interception because the emails were forwarded once Infusino received them, 
not while the emails were in transit.267 
The Seventh Circuit declined to require in-transit interception of the emails 
Infusino received.268  The court held that from a technical perspective, 
in-transit interception was impossible because there was never a single 
communication while the emails were transmitted to Infusino.269  Emails are 
split up into multiple communications and only reassembled once they reach 
their intended recipient.270  Szymuszkiewicz could only acquire the emails 
by duplicating and forwarding the contents.271  Thus, a second transmission 
containing the same data as another communication was a necessary element 
of wiretap interception.272 
2.  Ninth Circuit:  Digital Advertisers Are Not Exempt Parties 
The Ninth Circuit considered and rejected the Third Circuit’s holding.273  
In the Ninth Circuit’s view, recipients of a duplicate GET request containing 
the same data as another GET request were not exempt parties.274  In In re 
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Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litigation, internet users sued Facebook for 
the alleged interception of the users’ GET request data sent to websites.275 
Facebook embedded plug-ins on websites on the internet.276  These 
plug-ins allowed internet users to “like” content on the website.277  The 
plug-ins also collected user data including URLs of the websites the users 
visited, referral information indicating the websites that users last visited, and 
search query terms.278  Facebook retained and identified this user data.279 
At a technical level, Facebook’s collection of user data leveraged GET 
requests.280  When users visited a website, an initial GET request was 
generated between the users and the websites containing user data.281  
Simultaneously, the Facebook plug-in generated a duplicate GET request 
between the users and Facebook.282  This duplicate contained the same user 
data that appeared in the GET request sent from users to the websites.283 
In assessing this fact pattern, the lower court had held that the party 
exception did not apply.284  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the 
decisions in In re Pharmatrak and Szymuszkiewicz.285  The Ninth Circuit 
interpreted both cases as punishing surreptitious listeners.286  The Ninth 
Circuit also noted that both In re Pharmatrak and Szymuszkiewicz identified 
wiretap interception where two communications contained duplicate data 
shared between more than one communication.287  There was also duplicate 
data here.288  Facebook’s GET request contained the same user data as the 
GET request sent from the internet users to websites that contained 
Facebook’s plug-in.289 
The Ninth Circuit then concluded that a surreptitious GET request 
containing duplicate user data from another GET request could not accord 
party status.290  The court relied heavily on legislative intent to buttress the 
First and Seventh Circuits’ persuasive decisions.291  The Ninth Circuit 
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interpreted the Wiretap Act as prohibiting the acquisition of communications 
by surreptitious listeners hidden from the lawful parties to a 
communication.292  Using legislative intent, the Ninth Circuit held that 
allowing Facebook to invoke the party exception would allow frequent and 
unknown collection of user data.293  For the Ninth Circuit, this was an 
exception that swallowed the rule.294 
IV.  DIGITAL ADVERTISERS ARE UNINTENDED RECIPIENTS AND INELIGIBLE 
FOR THE PARTY EXCEPTION 
Part IV argues that when digital advertisers receive a duplicate GET 
request, they are unintended recipients ineligible for the party exception.  Part 
IV.A contends that when two GET requests contain duplicate data, the 
duplicate data should be the focus of a court’s party analysis.  Part IV.B notes 
that when two communications contain duplicate data, equating the direct 
recipient of a GET request with an intended recipient lacks judicial support 
and cannot properly decide party status.  Part IV.C concludes that when the 
GET requests’ duplicate data is analyzed, digital advertisers are unintended 
recipients of that user data.  Part IV.C.1 confirms this by analyzing the 
manifestations of sender intent.  Part IV.C.2 reaches the same conclusion by 
analyzing the user data’s intended destination. 
A.  Duplicate GET Requests Create a Possibility of Interception 
In re Google’s facts presented the Third Circuit with two GET requests.  
One was between users and the websites they visited.295  The other was 
between internet users and digital advertisers.296  These GET requests were 
duplicate insofar as they shared the same user data.297  Users in the Third 
Circuit argued that advertisers intercepted data in the GET request between 
users and websites.298  However, the court rejected this theory and instead 
isolated its wiretap interception analysis to the GET request between users 
and digital advertisers.299  Isolating the analysis to only one GET request and 
its data was improper because it misconstrues how user data is intercepted. 
When two communications contain the same user data, courts routinely 
factor this into their analysis.  In Vasil, the defendant received a 
communication that conveyed user data from another communication 
between users and a mobile application.300  The defendant in In re iPhone 
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received a communication that contained user data from another 
communication between the users’ iPhones and cellular towers.301  
Samsung’s communication in White conveyed users’ television viewing data, 
all of which was contained in another communication between the users and 
content providers.302  The communication in In re Pharmatrak conveyed user 
data that also appeared in another communication between users and 
websites.303  Each decision found support for interception and held that the 
party exception did not apply.304 
These courts correctly analyzed both duplicate communications and the 
duplicate data because it is the smoking gun of unlawful interception.  
Szymuszkiewicz recognized that a second communication can be necessary in 
order to intercept certain user data.305  Emails are broken up into packets of 
information and sent using many different communications.306  In order to 
intercept an email broken up into packets, a second communication must 
duplicate and transmit the contents.307  Other user data is broken up into 
packets of information.308  This can include the GET request exchange.309  
Accordingly, the same logic can apply to GET requests.  User data in a GET 
request may be intercepted by duplicating the contents of one GET request 
and transmitting that data using a second communication.  This means that 
intercepting a GET request may involve the use of a second 
communication.310  Intercepting GET requests may appear different than 
recording an oral conversation311 or wiretapping a telephone line,312 but it is 
still a potential form of interception.313 
Not every GET request necessarily relies on multiple packets to transmit 
the initial user data—far from it.  The transmission of user data via a GET 
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request may only use a single packet.314  In fact, the total exchange should 
include as few packets as possible.315  That said, the response to a GET 
request may generate many packets to transmit website content.316 
Even so, cookies identifying user data can increase the size of an initial 
GET request’s data, thus employing additional packets for the 
transmission.317  Particular senders, recipients, or pathways between senders 
and recipients may warrant additional packets.318  Accordingly, second 
communications remain an effective method of capturing user data where 
there is uncertainty as to whether data in the first communication will be 
found within a single easily intercepted transmission.319  Furthermore, GET 
requests may be sent using HTTPS connections, in which case the user data 
in the GET request is encrypted.320  At that point, a duplicate GET request 
may not only be an effective method of interception, but a necessary one. 
As a result, the Third Circuit was quick to exclude the GET request 
between users and websites.321  The GET request digital advertisers received 
could contain the data of a GET request between users and websites because 
that data was intercepted.  When user data is shared between two GET 
requests, this is not evidence that interception is unnecessary;322 it is 
evidence that interception may have occurred.323  The Third Circuit also 
erred when it did not identify a device “capable of capturing” the GET 
requests between users and websites.324  The GET request that advertisers 
receive is the answer.  The duplicate GET request is an “artifice” that not 
 
 314. See Fox, supra note 309 (contemplating an HTTP request, which can include a GET 
request, contained within a single packet). 
 315. See HTTP/2 Frequently Asked Questions, INTERNET ENG’G TASK FORCE, 
https://http2.github.io/faq [https://perma.cc/F8Y8-B3ZB] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021) 
(advocating for the compression of data to reduce the number of requests and speed up 
websites). 
 316. See Fox, supra note 309 (“[E]ach HTTP response [versus the HTTP request] is inside 
another IP packet—or more typically, multiple packets, since the response data can be quite 
large.”). 
 317. An Analysis of Cookie Sizes on the Web, PAUL CALVANO (July 13, 2020), 
https://paulcalvano.com/2020-07-13-an-analysis-of-cookie-sizes-on-the-web 
[https://perma.cc/Z99D-86ZF] (examining how the size of cookies can dictate whether 
“multiple TCP packets” are used in an HTTP request, including GET requests). 
 318. See Maximum Packet Size, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/ztpf/ 
1.1.0.15?topic=addresses-maximum-packet-size [https://perma.cc/8DLN-Z3PJ] (last visited 
Sept. 17, 2021) (describing how a client, server, and network can have varying maximum 
packet sizes resulting in the use of additional packets if data exceeds the maximum packet 
size). 
 319. See United States v. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 2010) (concluding 
that when packets are in use in the transmission of data, the underlying data must then be 
copied). 
 320. See Introduction to HTTPS, CIO COUNCIL, https://https.cio.gov/faq 
[https://perma.cc/7WDA-VM4Z] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
 321. In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 142 (3d Cir. 
2015) (isolating the exception analysis). 
 322. Id. at 140–41 (“[T]here is no need . . . to acquire that information from [other] 
transmissions . . .  [T]he defendants would have the information at issue anyway.”). 
 323. See In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 22 (1st Cir. 2003); see also Szymuszkiewicz, 
622 F.3d at 706. 
 324. In re Google, 806 F.3d at 141–42. 
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only displays digital advertisements but also, by its function, redirects 
duplicate data between the user and the website.325 
The Third Circuit should have asked whether the two GET requests were 
so interrelated that they create the possibility of interception.  If so, the court 
should have assessed whether the advertiser was an intended recipient of that 
duplicate data.  Focusing on the data recognizes that interception can occur 
when data is duplicated, even if that process requires a second GET 
request.326  Otherwise, the court turns a blind eye to a common method of 
interception:  duplicating user data and transmitting it using a second 
communication.327  The Wiretap Act’s party exception protects parties to a 
communication.328  The party exception does not protect novel forms of 
interception.329 
The GET request between users and advertisers qualifies as the sort of 
communication that should be analyzed in terms of duplicate data.  First, the 
GET request that advertisers receive contains duplicate data found in another 
GET request.330  A GET request containing duplicate data from another GET 
request mirrors the communications in Vasil, In re iPhone, White, In re 
Pharmatrak, and Szymuszkiewicz, where one communication contained the 
same data as another communication creating the risk that the data was 
obtained by interception.331  As such, two GET requests containing duplicate 
data should be analyzed in terms of the data’s intended recipient because that 
duplicate data may indicate that it was likewise obtained by interception.332 
Second, the advertisers’ duplicate GET request is automatically generated 
when the GET request between users and websites is created.333  This is what 
Szymuszkiewicz interception would expect—affirming the risk that the 
duplicate data is being intercepted using a second GET request.  One 
communication’s content is being intercepted using a second 
communication; an effective, or even necessary, method of interception for 
 
 325. Vasil v. Kiip, Inc., No. 16-CV-09937, 2018 WL 1156328, at *6 n.5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 
2018). 
 326. In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 22 (concluding that wiretap interception does not 
require the interception of the same communication and that two duplicate communications 
are sufficient). 
 327. See Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 706. 
 328. Warden v. Kahn, 160 Cal. Rptr. 473, 475 (Ct. App. 1979); see supra note 41 and 
accompanying text (confirming that Warden’s state law interpretation is equivalent to the 
federal law exception). 
 329. Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 706; Vasil, 2018 WL 1156328, at *6 (declining to reward 
tech savvy wiretappers); In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1062 (N.D. 
Cal. 2012) (“Apple cannot manufacture a statutory exception . . . .”). 
 330. In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 596 (9th Cir. 2020) 
(explaining that the “like” button “is able to replicate [user data].”); In re Google Inc. Cookie 
Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 140 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 331. See supra notes 300–20 and accompanying text. 
 332. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., No. 17-1775, 2019 WL 8886485, at *5 (D.N.J. 
Aug. 21, 2019). 
 333. See In re Google, 806 F.3d at 130; see also In re Facebook, 956 F.3d at 607. 
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data.334  When the Third Circuit declined to analyze the intended recipient of 
the duplicate data, the court ignored an indicium of interception.335 
B.  Direct Receipt of GET Requests Cannot Decide Party Status 
After too quickly isolating its analysis, the Third Circuit equated the direct 
recipient of a duplicate GET request with an intended recipient.336  This 
standard is inconsistent with case law and cannot accurately decide party 
status for GET requests that share data.  Case law indicates that the 
interception of data appears deceptively direct—from user to alleged 
wrongdoer. 
In Vasil, the communication flowed directly from the users’ phones to 
Vasil’s servers.337  Although Vasil applied Illinois state law, the court noted 
that the Illinois definition of a party “comports” with the federal definition.338  
The court held that federal law does not equate direct and intended 
recipients.339  Likewise, In re iPhone involved an intentional transmission 
sent directly from “mobile devices to Apple’s servers.”340  The court declined 
to apply the party exception.341  The Third Circuit is not bound by either legal 
decision.  Yet, both courts were confronted with direct recipients and did not 
find that factor valuable in deciding exempt party status. 
It is possible that the Third Circuit has found some value in equating direct 
receipt with an intended recipient that lower courts have not.  That said, New 
Jersey federal district court’s decision in White and a subsequent reading of 
White in New Concepts for Living, Inc. v. Communications Workers Local 
1040342 may demonstrate the limited value of the standard for electronic 
communications. 
In White, the court rejected Samsung’s argument that relevant 
communications “were transmissions from Plaintiffs’ Smart TVs to 
[Samsung’s] servers,” which—if Samsung had been correct—would imply 
that the communications were “directly received” by Samsung and exempt 
according to a direct receipt standard.343 
Rather, the court in New Concepts for Living, Inc. read White as describing 
“allegedly captured transmissions that were not being directly sent to 
[Samsung].”344  For this reason, White can be viewed as a case of a liable 
indirect recipient, and In re Google can be viewed as a case of a direct 
 
 334. See supra notes 300–20 and accompanying text. 
 335. See supra notes 300–20 and accompanying text. 
 336. In re Google, 806 F.3d at 140–42. 
 337. Vasil v. Kiip, Inc., No. 16-CV-09937, 2018 WL 1156328, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 
2018). 
 338. Id. 
 339. See id. at *7. 
 340. In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
 341. See id. 
 342. No. 19-719, 2021 WL 2201835 (D.N.J. May 28, 2021). 
 343. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., No. 17-1775, 2019 WL 8886485, at *5 (D.N.J. 
Aug. 21, 2019) (rejecting Samsung’s characterization, while noting that In re Google granted 
party status where Google “directly received their communications”). 
 344. See New Concepts for Living, Inc., 2021 WL 2201835, at *5. 
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recipient treated as an intended recipient.345  The trouble is that both White 
and In re Google describe alleged interception by indirect recipients no 
matter the fact that some underlying communications appear deceptively 
direct as they move from users to the defendants of each case. 
In White, Samsung was an indirect recipient because Samsung allegedly 
monitored communications between users’ television and content providers 
before receiving a second communication from “the Smart TV[s] to 
[Samsung’s] servers.”346  Despite the fact that Samsung was a party “to the 
latter communication” sent from users to Samsung, Samsung was not a direct 
recipient so long as the alleged interception began with a communication 
between the users’ televisions and the content providers.347  Receipt and 
party status in the second communication was not enough so long as alleged 
interception began with the first communication.348 
Yet, the GET request that an alleged wrongdoer typically receives takes an 
equally attenuated path—deceptively direct—from user to defendant.  Popa 
v. Harriet Carter Gifts, Inc.,349 in the Western District of Pennsylvania, 
examined the movement of a GET request from user to defendant—
Navistone—while relying on In re Google’s application of the direct 
recipient standard for party status.350  Despite concluding that Navistone was 
“a direct party” to the GET request received, that communication first relied 
on a transmission between user and website:  “[t]he visitor’s browser first 
sends a GET request to [the website’s] server, and that server responds,” 
which only then prompts the additional GET requests transmitted toward 
Navistone.351 
In this way, In re Google and Popa both describe a GET request moving 
from user to defendant prompted only by virtue of an earlier communication 
between the user and the website.352  Like in White, however direct a 
defendant’s receipt of a GET request appears, alleged interception begins by 
relying on an initial communication between two other parties that does not 
include the defendant.  In White, Samsung relied on communications 
 
 345. See id. (distinguishing White from In re Google by concluding that White included 
“captured transmissions that were not being directly sent to [Samsung],” while In re Google 
“involved direct receipt by those defendants of the relevant communications”). 
 346. White, 2019 WL 8886485, at *5. 
 347. See id. 
 348. See id. 
 349. No. 2:19-CV-450, 2021 WL 2463304 (W.D. Pa. June 17, 2021). 
 350. Id. at *7–8 (“The processes and operations underlying the communications between a 
user’s web browser, Harriet Carter’s website server, and Navistone’s servers are materially 
similar to those discussed in In re Google.”).  Popa decides a state law claim.  However, the 
court concluded that Pennsylvania law is equivalent to the Wiretap Act. Id. at *6. 
 351. See id. at *7–8. 
 352. See In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 140  
(3d Cir. 2015) (noting that the GET request from a user to a digital advertiser is prompted by 
an earlier GET request exchange between a user and a website); see also id. at *7 (noting 
visitors send an initial GET request to the website before the server prompts GET requests 
sent to the defendant). 
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between users and content providers.353  In Popa and In re Google, 
defendants relied on GET requests between users and websites.354  Receiving 
a communication dependent on another transmission—all the while sharing 
that earlier transmission’s data—means that a defendant’s communication is 
the indirect result of a former communication that defendants “are not a party 
to” and not merely a communication “directly received.”355 
Notwithstanding the trouble identifying bona fide direct receipt of 
electronic communications reliant on other transmissions, the Third Circuit’s 
interest in direct recipients may arise from Pasha’s interpretation of intended 
recipients.  The court cited Pasha in an unrelated analysis.356  In Pasha, the 
court analyzed whether a communication reached its intended destination 
uninterrupted.357  This was one way to distinguish intended and unintended 
recipients.358  However, the Third Circuit’s reasoning suggests that any direct 
recipient of a communication is an intended recipient.359  This interpretation 
appears inconsistent with Pasha.  The Third Circuit focused on whether a 
GET request reached its destination directly but did not ask if the GET 
request had reached its “destined place.”360 
This suggests that the Third Circuit’s reasoning either misinterprets Pasha 
or lacks judicial support.  If the Third Circuit created a new standard, it 
cannot properly decide party status for duplicate GET requests.  Under this 
standard, a court would ask if a GET request reached a destination 
uninterrupted without deciding if the GET request reached an intended 
destination.361  If there is only one GET request, and one recipient to analyze, 
this standard makes sense.  Every protected communication includes at least 
one sender and one recipient.362  Otherwise, no communication exists to 
begin with.363  If a plaintiff can only identify one communication and one 
recipient, then that recipient must have been intended.364 
In this situation, identifying a direct recipient is useful because interception 
requires at least three entities:  (1) a lawful sender, (2) an intended recipient, 
and (3) an unintended recipient that is tampering with the communication.365  
 
 353. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., No. 17-1775, 2019 WL 8886485, at *5 (D.N.J. 
Aug. 21, 2019). 
 354. See supra note 352 and accompanying text. 
 355. See White, 2019 WL 8886485, at *5–6; see also supra Part IV.A (describing the 
possibility of Szymuszkiewicz interception where two electronic communications share the 
same underlying data). 
 356. See In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 143–44 
(3d Cir. 2015). 
 357. See United States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d 193, 198 (7th Cir. 1964). 
 358. See supra notes 158–63 and accompanying text. 
 359. See In re Google, 806 F.3d at 142. 
 360. Pasha, 332 F.2d at 198 (quoting Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942)). 
 361. See supra notes 359–60 and accompanying text. 
 362. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 363. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 364. See Crowley v. CyberSource Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1269 (N.D. Cal. 2001) 
(concluding that the only identifiable recipient was a party when there was no evidence of 
tampering). 
 365. See supra notes 193–201 and accompanying text. 
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Here, the unintended recipient tampers with the underlying communication 
so that it no longer reaches its intended destination uninterrupted.366  If there 
is only one possible recipient and one identifiable communication, a direct 
recipient could not have tampered with the communication.367  The 
communication had nowhere else to go.368  By default, the direct recipient 
becomes the communication’s intended recipient and a lawful party.369 
For duplicate GET requests, the direct recipient of a single GET request 
says little.  Here, there are two recipients:  websites users visit and 
advertisers.370  A court must identify the intended recipients of the data 
because one communication could intercept the data from another 
communication.371  In this case, digital advertisers are direct recipients of a 
GET request, but the GET request may still leverage another GET request by 
duplicating user data between users and websites.372 
As a result, the direct recipient of a duplicate GET request is equally 
consistent with the three-entity requirement of a surreptitious listener.373  
When a user sends a GET request, websites are intended recipients, and 
advertisers receive a duplicate GET request to eavesdrop on users and 
websites as the third entity in the exchange.374  When duplicate GET requests 
can be evidence of interception, even the direct recipients thereof could be 
intercepting data.375  A court must analyze whether advertisers are intended 
recipients of the duplicate data, not whether advertisers are direct recipients 
of the suspect data. 
C.  Digital Advertisers Are Ineligible for the Party Exception 
Part IV.C concludes that digital advertisers are unintended recipients of 
duplicate user data shared by two GET requests.  Part IV.C adopts two 
methods for distinguishing intended and unintended recipients.  Part IV.C.1 
assesses manifestations of sender intent when internet users communicate 
 
 366. See United States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d 193, 198 (7th Cir. 1964) (quoting Goldman v. 
United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942)). 
 367. Contrast this with a surreptitious listener who intrudes upon a communication between 
two parties:  a sender and an intended recipient. See supra notes 200–01 and accompanying 
text. 
 368. See Jurgens v. Build.com, Inc., No. 17-CV-00783, 2017 WL 5277679, at *5  
(E.D. Mo. Nov. 13, 2017) (“[I]f there was an ‘electronic communication’ here, Defendant was 
a party to it.”). 
 369. See id. 
 370. See supra notes 224–26, 281–83 and accompanying text. 
 371. See supra Part IV.A. 
 372. See supra notes 321–35 and accompanying text. 
 373. See supra notes 193–201 and accompanying text. 
 374. Once a duplicate communication is seen as an indicium of interception, that may 
enable a court to conclude that the party exception should not apply. See supra notes 300–25 
and accompanying text.  However, under an intended recipient analysis, a court will still need 
to confirm that the defendant was not the intended recipient of the duplicate communication’s 
data by going on to assess either manifestations of sender intent or the intended destination. 
See supra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2.  But now the analysis must focus on the duplicate data (i.e., the 
content being allegedly intercepted). See supra Part IV.A. 
 375. See supra notes 300–25 and accompanying text. 
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data in GET requests.  Part IV.C.2 considers the intended destination of GET 
requests’ data.  Using either approach, advertisers are unintended recipients 
ineligible for the party exception. 
1.  Manifestations of Sender Intent and GET Request Data 
Internet users manifest the intent to send user data to websites, not to 
digital advertisers.  In Backhaut and Roden the manifestations of sender 
intent were explicit.376  Cellphone users addressed text messages to a 
particular recipient.377  In Roden, the court accepted a sender’s reasonable 
expectation that a text message would reach the identified recipient, not 
someone else.378  The same explicit manifestations of intent appear in GET 
requests; that intent does not include transmission to digital advertisers. 
Here, an internet users’ web browsers navigate the internet via GET 
requests.379  Internet users make it clear that they want to communicate with 
a particular website when they enter a website’s URL or click on a website’s 
link.380  But any intent to communicate with advertisers is difficult to locate.  
Unlike entering a URL or clicking a link, a duplicate GET request is 
generated automatically in a process invisible to users.381 
It is illogical to say that users explicitly intend to communicate data with 
digital advertisers when the transfer of the user data happens without the 
users’ involvement and is hidden from the users’ view.382  Furthermore, 
when advertisers gain access to data invisibly, they become surreptitious 
listeners that the Wiretap Act punishes, not exempt parties that the Wiretap 
Act should absolve.383 
However, Vasil might allow a court to infer an intent to communicate with 
digital advertisers.  The court inferred intent based on how users expect 
phones to communicate data based on privacy settings.384  Roden was also 
 
 376. See Backhaut v. Apple, 74 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 2014); State v. Roden, 
321 P.3d 1183, 1189 (Wash. 2014). 
 377. See Roden, 321 P.3d at 1189 (“[S]ending a text is more like mailing a letter.  The 
sender addresses mail to a particular individual and reasonably expects the communication to 
be routed to and received by the addressee.”); see also Backhaut, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 1043–44 
(concluding that plaintiff’s allegations that text messages were not “addressed or directed to 
Apple” created a viable claim of interception on a motion to dismiss). 
 378. See Roden, 321 P.3d at 1189. 
 379. See In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 130 
(3d Cir. 2015); see also In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 607 (9th 
Cir. 2020) (“When an individual internet user visits a web page, his or her browser sends a 
message called a ‘GET request’ . . . .”). 
 380. See In re Facebook, 956 F.3d, at 596 (quoting In re Zynga Priv. Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 
1101 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
 381. See id. (describing the GET process as “undetectable”); In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 
F.3d at 9, 22 (1st Cir. 2003) (describing Pharmatrak’s use of GET requests and then 
characterizing the process as “code that automatically duplicated part of the communication”). 
 382. See supra note 381 and accompanying text. 
 383. United States v. Eady, No. 14-277, 2015 WL 1735495, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2015). 
 384. See Vasil v. Kiip, Inc., No. 16-CV-09937, 2018 WL 1156328, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 
2018) (inferring the possible intended recipients based on the privacy settings a user could 
select). 
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interested in the reasonable expectations of a user.385  Internet users 
understand that their electronic data is monetized.386  Advertisers commonly 
monetize user data.387  In this way, internet users may reasonably expect to 
communicate with advertisers when they navigate the internet. 
But Vasil and Roden inferred intent to protect electronic communications, 
not exempt defendants.388  A court may disfavor Wiretap Act interpretations 
that create broad liability exceptions.389  A user cannot consent to 
interception simply because the user knows interception is possible.390  This 
would limit the Wiretap Act to uninformed plaintiffs.  The Wiretap Act does 
not exempt novel forms of interception.391  This would limit the Wiretap Act 
to only the sort of interception a court has seen before.  Courts should not 
limit the Wiretap Act merely because internet users have grown to expect 
advertisers on the internet.  This would limit liability for the pervasive 
eavesdropper.392 
If there is any intent to generate a duplicate GET request, it comes from 
digital advertisers, not internet users.  Digital advertisers intend to 
communicate with internet users when they embed code that will generate 
the duplicate GET request.393  But recipient intent is not enough for the party 
exception.394  Apple could not invoke the party exception because it designed 
iPhones to transmit user data to Apple’s servers.395  Samsung could not 
invoke the party exception because it developed software to transmit user 
data directly from a user’s television to Samsung.396  Similarly, advertisers 
should not be able to invoke the party exception because they intentionally 
manufactured GET requests. 
 
 385. See State v. Roden, 321 P.3d 1183, 1189 (Wash. 2014). 
 386. See In re Nickelodeon Consumer Priv. Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 266 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(accepting that users understand that their data is not entirely private and that their data is 
monetized). 
 387. See id. 
 388. See Vasil, 2018 WL 1156328, at *6; see also Roden, 321 P.3d at 1189 (concluding 
that a user’s reasonable expectations do not include unaddressed recipients). 
 389. In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 608 (9th Cir. 2020) 
(disfavoring a statutory interpretation of parties that would allow the “exception to swallow 
the rule”). 
 390. See, e.g., Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 581 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(“[K]nowledge of the capability of monitoring alone cannot be considered implied consent.”). 
 391. See supra note 329 and accompanying text. 
 392. In re Facebook, 956 F.3d at 589, 608 (“The unauthorized duplication and forwarding 
of unknowing users’ information would render permissible the most common methods of 
intrusion . . . .”). 
 393. See id. at 596. 
 394. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 395. In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“Apple 
cannot manufacture a statutory exception through its own accused conduct . . . .”). 
 396. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., No. 17-1775, 2019 WL 8886485, at *6 (D.N.J. 
Aug. 21, 2019) (“Plaintiffs allege that Defendants surreptitiously installed software on their 
televisions that permitted Defendants to track their communications . . . .  Defendants’ 
argument that they were parties to these communications is unavailing.”). 
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In sum, users only manifest clear intent to communicate with the websites 
that the users visit via a URL or hyperlink.397  A court need not stretch to 
find some other manifestation of sender intent where the intent is clear.  
When users clearly intended to communicate with doctors, business 
associates, or sexual partners, then a court did not search for other exempt 
parties.398  Likewise, when websites are unambiguously users’ intended 
recipients via a URL, advertisers receive duplicate GET requests as 
unintended recipients because websites are the focus of sender intent.  As 
unintended recipients of the data in a GET request, advertisers are ineligible 
for the party exception.399 
2.  Intended Destinations and GET Request Data 
The court in Pasha decided whether a communication reached its 
“destined place” uninterrupted.400  If so, the recipient was a party.401  If a 
telephone call reached its intended telephone, anyone who answered the call 
was a party.402  Corporations accessing communications intended for their 
web servers are parties, too.403  An unintended recipient tampers with the 
communication and redirects that communication to an unintended 
destination in order to gain access.404  In Pasha, the intended destination was 
explicit because a particular telephone number was dialed.405  In Jurgens and 
Crowley, the intended destinations were implied because the 
communications had nowhere else to go.406  These recipients merely 
accessed communications that were sent to their servers.407  In Crowley this 
ruled out tampering.408 
Like Pasha’s telephone, the data in an internet user’s GET request has an 
explicit intended destination.  The intended destination does not include 
 
 397. See supra notes 380–83 and accompanying text. 
 398. See Lopez v. Apple, Inc., No. 19-04577, 2021 WL 823122, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 
2021). 
 399. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 400. United States v. Pasha, 332 F.2d 193, 198 (7th Cir. 1964) (quoting Goldman v. United 
States, 316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942)). 
 401. Id. (concluding that law enforcement had not intercepted the telephone conversations 
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identifying tampering as interception). 
 403. Crowley v. CyberSource Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1269 (N.D. Cal. 2001) 
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communication.” (quoting Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942))). 
 405. See id. at 196. 
 406. See Jurgens v. Build.com, Inc., No. 17-CV-00783, 2017 WL 5277679, at *5–6 (E.D. 
Mo. Nov. 13, 2017) (concluding that if there was a communication, then the defendant was a 
party and that otherwise, there would be no communication); see also Crowley, 166 F. Supp. 
2d at 1269 (“Amazon merely received the information transferred to it . . . an act without 
which there would be no transfer.  Amazon acted as . . . the second party . . . .”). 
 407. See supra note 406 and accompanying text. 
 408. See Crowley, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 1269 (concluding that receiving an email was as 
benign as answering a telephone). 
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digital advertisers.  Internet users visit a website by entering its URL or 
clicking on a hyperlink.409  URLs and hyperlinks include the website’s 
domain name (e.g., “nytimes.com”).410  Each domain name is assigned a 
unique IP address identifying the location of the website and its content.411  
An IP address is the internet’s equivalent of a telephone number.412  Entering 
the URL or clicking on a hyperlink generates the GET request containing 
user data that calls out to that IP address.413  A website’s servers are assigned 
to the IP address and respond to the GET request with the website’s 
content.414  Therefore, when users enter a URL or click on a hyperlink, they 
identify a website as the intended destination. 
But unlike Pasha, the GET request’s data reaches a second destination:  
the server of a digital advertiser.415  Nothing in the initial URL or hyperlink 
identifies digital advertisers’ servers as an intended destination.  According 
to Pasha, the GET request’s data should only reach its intended destination.  
Pasha cannot help advertisers where GET request data reaches an intended 
destination but also a second unexpected destination.416 
This result still has all the attributes of an unintended recipient ineligible 
for the party exception.  First, digital advertisers embed the code to generate 
a duplicate GET request with a second destination.417  Then, digital 
advertisers are still acting like a manufactured recipient punished by 
courts.418  Second, digital advertisers receive a second GET request with 
duplicate data.  This is still an indicator of Szymuszkiewicz interception.419  
Third, digital advertisers engage in this conduct invisibly; courts punish the 
surreptitious listener.420 
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Each of these factors should disqualify advertisers from invoking party 
status.  The intended destination of user data does not rebut this conclusion 
because the only identifiable intended destination was a website identified by 
an IP address.421  That being so, when a duplicate GET request’s data is sent 
to an advertiser’s server, the advertiser is an unintended recipient. 
Jurgens and Crowley offer no support for digital advertisers.  There, 
intended destinations were inferred because there was only one possible 
recipient.422  Here, there is already an intended destination and it is the 
website’s servers, not advertisers.423  With all the indications of 
interception,424 and nothing to suggest advertisers’ servers were intended,425 
courts can only conclude that advertisers’ servers were an unintended 
destination.  Advertisers are thus ineligible for a party exception. 
CONCLUSION 
User data can be intercepted by duplication and transmission of that data 
using a second communication.426  It then follows that duplicate data in a 
second GET request may indicate interception.427  Therefore, courts must 
decide party status by analyzing the user data’s intended recipient by 
assessing manifestations of sender intent or the user data’s intended 
destination.428  The URLs and hyperlinks users employ to visit websites 
identify the websites as the intended recipients of user data.429  The same 
cannot be said for digital advertisers.430  Accordingly, digital advertisers are 
unintended recipients and ineligible for the Wiretap Act’s party exception. 
If interception on the internet is properly understood, the party exception 
is unavailable for duplicate GET requests.  This Note does not discount the 
Ninth Circuit’s focus on legislative intent to reach the same result.431  This 
Note also does not forget the power of consent to otherwise exempt wiretap 
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defendants.432  Still, examining how data is intercepted on the internet reveals 
a cacophony of GET requests that are ineligible for the party exception. 
 
 432. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text. 
